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Abstract
The security of Deep Reinforcement Learning
(Deep RL) algorithms deployed in real life ap-
plications are of a primary concern. In particu-
lar, the robustness of RL agents in cyber-physical
systems against adversarial attacks are especially
vital since the cost of a malevolent intrusions can
be extremely high. Studies have shown Deep
Neural Networks (DNN), which forms the core
decision-making unit in most modern RL algo-
rithms, are easily subjected to adversarial attacks.
Hence, it is imperative that RL agents deployed
in real-life applications have the capability to de-
tect and mitigate adversarial attacks in an online
fashion. An example of such a framework is
the Meta-Learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH)
agent that utilizes a meta-learning framework to
learn policies robustly online. Since the mecha-
nism of this framework are still not fully explored,
we conducted multiple experiments to better un-
derstand the framework’s capabilities and limita-
tions. Our results shows that the MLAH agent
exhibits interesting coping behaviours when sub-
jected to different adversarial attacks to maintain
a nominal reward. Additionally, the framework
exhibits a hierarchical coping capability, based
on the adaptability of the Master policy and sub-
policies themselves. From empirical results, we
also observed that as the interval of adversarial
attacks increase, the MLAH agent can maintain a
higher distribution of rewards, though at the cost
of higher instabilities.
1. Introduction
Rapid development of deep neural networks in recent years
have sparked subsequent advancements in the field of rein-
forcement learning. Using deep neural networks as function
approximators/policies, the field of Deep Reinforcement
Learning (Deep RL) has seen numerous success stories.
Examples of Deep RL agents beating Atari (Mnih et al.,
2015), learning generalizable policies for robotic manipu-
lation (Ebert et al., 2018) and searching for good neural
network architectures (Zoph & Le, 2016) are a few of the
examples. As a result, that has subsequently led to Deep
RL frameworks getting deployed in real world applications
such as health care (Peng et al., 2018; Komorowski et al.,
2018), finance (Deng et al., 2017), engineering (Lee et al.,
2018; Neftci & Averbeck, 2002) and many more. While
the application of Deep RL has been successful in many
fields, the security of such systems are also increasingly
being scrutinized as an increasing number of studies show
that these systems are also not fully reliable.
In the field of deep learning, (Goodfellow et al., 2015) has
shown that deep neural networks are extremely fragile and
image classifiers constructed from convolutional neural net-
works (CNN) can be easily deceived to classify images
wrongly just by changing the values of a few pixels using the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). This opens up a large
and realistic possibility that systems deployed with deep
neural networks may be subjected to adversarial attacks. In
the context of real world applications such as detection of
dangerous objects in cargo shipments (Jaccard et al., 2016)
and autonomous navigation in self-driving vehicles (Rausch
et al., 2017), the consequences of misclassifying an object
due to a potential adversarial attack are extremely high.
Similarly, the possibility of an adversarial attack on Deep
RL systems has also been investigated. In a similar manner
of adversarial attacks on image classifiers, (Huang et al.,
2017) showed that it is possible to augment the RL agent’s
observation to fool a trained RL agent to take a sub-optimal
action. In addition to that, (Tretschk et al., 2018) demon-
strated that instead of fooling the agent to take sub-optimal
actions, it is also possible to trick the RL agent into pursuing
an adversarially defined goal.
Therefore, it is crucial for an RL agent to be able defend
against such adversarial attacks by detecting the presence
of adversaries and mitigate any unwanted consequences.
One possible crude defense strategy will be for the agent
to raise a warning or autonomously shut itself down in the
event of a detected adversary. However, a more elegant
defense strategy is for the RL agent to be able to detect
and cope with such adversaries in an online manner. A
previous study by (Havens et al., 2018) has shown that it
is possible for an RL agent to robustly learn policies while
subjected adversarial attacks by using a hierarchical meta-
learning framework. From a high level point of view, the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
12
06
1v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
8 J
un
 20
19
Learning to cope with adversarial attacks
framework utilizes a master policy that detects whether an
adversary is present through the advantages of sub-policies
that are optimized for different tasks and decides which sub-
policy to use. Nonetheless, the capabilities of the proposed
framework are still not fully understood. For example, how
exactly is the agent coping when an adversary is detected?
Or how does the frequency of attacks affect the performance
of the agent?
Inspired by such questions, we perform several experiments
to gain insights and a better understanding of the capabil-
ity of this proposed framework. In this work, we present
the results of our findings in hopes of encouraging future
research in the direction of discovering effective and viable
defensive strategies.
2. Related Works
Multiple studies have shown that RL agent are easily sus-
ceptible to adversarial attacks. (Huang et al., 2017) showed
that by extending the framework of FGSM to RL agents,
the RL agents can be tricked into behaving sub-optimally.
(Behzadan & Munir, 2017a) experimented with transferra-
bility of attacks on DQN agents and showed that a properly
crafted attack can easily be transferred to another agent with
a different model while retaining similar effectiveness. Ad-
ditionally, more sophisticated adversarial techniques have
been proposed by (Lin et al., 2017a). In their experiment,
the authors suggests that rather than perturbing the observa-
tion of the RL agent repeatedly, it is sufficient to attack the
RL agent at strategic time points when the relative prefer-
ence of the optimal action over the least optimal action is
higher than a certain threshold. In addition, the authors also
proposed another possible adversarial strategy called the
enchanting attack. In this strategy, a series of perturbations
are crafted such that the succession of adversarial states will
lead the agent to a specific target adversarial state.
In response to the security concern of these Deep RL frame-
works, multiple defensive strategies against such adver-
sarial attacks have been proposed. (Behzadan & Munir,
2017b) first showed that a nominally trained RL agents in-
herently have the capability of recovering from sparse or
non-contiguous attack. Their experiment results also demon-
strated that RL agents trained under adversarial conditions
turned out to be more robust against test time attacks, thus
making adversarial training a good candidate method to ro-
bustify RL agents. From a totally different standpoint, (Lin
et al., 2017b) approached the problem by comparing the
action of the agent acting on the current observation versus
the action of the agent acting on a predicted current obser-
vation. The predicted current observation is conditioned
on previous observations using a future frame prediction
model. The authors proposed this framework as a method to
detect the presence of an adversary and to use the predicted
Figure 1. Illustration of the MLAH framework. The Master policy
observes the advantages of each sub-policy and decides the optimal
sub-policy to employ. The selected sub-policy then acts on the
observation from the environment. Note that both the Master
policy and selected sub-policy receives the same reward signal
from the environment.
observation as the surrogate observation when adversaries
are detected.
Furthermore, (Havens et al., 2018) proposed an algorithm
that detects the presence of adversaries by observing the
advantages of sub-policies using a hierarchical framework.
Using the proposed algorithm, the results suggested that
the learned bias of the RL agent is greatly reduced under
adversarial conditions and a robust policy can be learnt
while in the presence of unknown adversaries. Leveraging
this existing framework, we further explore the viability of
using it as a defensive framework.
3. Background
As the foundation of the algorithm, we begin with a brief
overview of the metalearning shared hierarchies (MLSH)
framework as proposed by (Frans et al., 2017). In MLSH,
a Master policy parameterized by θ, is tasked to choose
a set of sub-policies, each parameterized by φ, to solve a
distribution of tasks. The experimental results from the
paper shows that a general set of primitive sub-policies
can be learned using these framework that can be shared
across different tasks. Using these sub-policies, only θ
from the Master policy needs to be re-trained for a given
new task as it adaptively chooses the correct sub-policies to
solve the new task. The re-training of the Master policy is
required due to the non-stationarity of the Markov Decision
Process (MDP) introduced by task switching, which may
not be known to the agent. The general problem can be
stated as the following: Given a set of MDPsM : {mi}n,
where mi is represented by the tuple (S,A,Pi,Ri), find
a policy to maximize the sum of rewards under the set of
tasks:
∑
t E∼ρ0,m0 [r(st)|mi ∈ M]. ρ0 is an initial state
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distribution and m0 is a initial MDP distribution. Note that
we assume the set of MDP’s shares the same state-action
space, but may differ in in reward functionR or transition
probability P (specifically due to the adversarial setting).
In a similar fashion, MLAH (Havens et al., 2018) introduces
a learned hierarchy where the parameterized Master policy
is additionally conditioned on the expectations of each sub-
policy. This allows the master agent to detect which task
is present in an unsupervised fashion via the reward signal
with respect to the expected reward (value or Q-function)
of each sub-policy. Depending onM, each sub-policy may
specialize in their respective tasks if it is optimal to do
so. As each sub-policy improves their performance and
value expectation in a task, the master agent improves in
selecting the correct sub-policy. An illustrative figure of this
framework is shown in Figure 1.
4. Methods
The following section describes the method we implemented
to demonstrate the coping behaviors of the MLAH frame-
work.
4.1. Environment
To demonstrate the coping behaviours that emerged from
this framework, we implemented the training of the agent on
a custom 2D grid world environment with a similar structure
as OpenAI’s gym environment (Brockman et al., 2016). In
this environment, the goal of the agent is to reach the center
coordinates of the grid world. At any time step t, the agent
is allowed to move up, down, left, right or take no actions.
At each time step, the agent gets a reward signal that is
equivalent to the scaled temporal difference of the Euclidean
distance to the goal, denoted as |d| in Equation 1, between
the current time step t and the previous time step t − 1.
Additionally, the agent is also penalized at each time step
with a value of -1 to encourage the agent to reach the goal
faster. If the agent reaches the goal, it receives a reward of
100. Last but not least, we set the maximum episode length
of each episode to a 100 steps.
r(st, at) =
{
100, if goal is reached
−1 + 10× (|d|t − |d|t−1), otherwise.
(1)
4.2. RL Agent
As the grid world environment is relatively low dimensional,
we implemented a simple deep neural network architecture
for the MLAH agent. We parameterized the the Master
policy using 2 dense layers with 16 hidden units on each
layer, with a final output dimension of 2, corresponding to
Figure 2. Illustration of a symmetric mirror attack on the RL agent
about the center vertical axis. Under this attack, the optimal policy
changes and the resulting action isn’t just sub-optimal but is instead
directly leading the agent away from the goal.
two sub-policies for nominal/adversary conditions. Each
sub-policy consists of another separate network with 2 dense
layers and 32 hidden units each. The sub-policies have
output dimensions of 5, representing the actual actions space
of the agent in the Grid World environment. Every dense
layer in the network is also followed by a tanh activation
layer.
4.3. Adversarial Functions
In terms of adversarial attacks, we define a few classes of
adversarial functions specific to the grid world to deploy on
the trained agent.
4.3.1. BIAS ATTACK
One class of adversarial function that we implemented was
the bias attack. The bias attacks takes in the (x, y) coordi-
nates of the agent and adds a certain value to the coordinates
in either the x-dimension, y-dimension or both. Due to the
symmetrical properties of the environment and depending
on the location of the agent, a naive bias attack wouldn’t
affect the nominal policy too much. For example, if the
agent in the left half region of the goal gets a bias attack of
a certain  that results in it still being in the left half region,
then the optimal action will still be to move right, regardless
of whether it is attacked. Hence, we only consider bias
attacks that induces a bias of more than half the dimension
of the environment to ensure that the optimal policy induced
by adversarial observation changes.
4.3.2. MIRROR ATTACK
Another class of adversarial function that we implemented
was the mirror attack. When the attack is active, the adver-
sary takes in the (x, y) coordinates of the agent and mirrors
the coordinate about the center axis of the grid world. In
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Figure 3. Comparison of a nominal agent with just one policy with the MLAH agent across multiple adversary attacks. The performance
of the nominal agent are shown in red and the rewards clearly show a periodic presence of adversarial attacks. Performance of the MLAH
(across different random seeds) are shown in cyan and there is a clear trend that the MLAH agent is able to cope against the adversarial
attacks to maintain a nominal reward.
the context of the grid world, this class of attacks has a
severe effect on the agent. As illustrated in Figure 2, when
the agent is in the region to the left side of the goal, the
agent’s optimal policy is the move right towards the goal.
However, when the attack is applied, the agent is fooled into
believing that it is in the region on the right side of the goal.
Therefore, based on the adversarially modified observation,
the agent’s optimal policy is to move left towards the goal,
which actually brings it further way from the goal. Similarly,
the mirror attack perturbation can be performed across the
center x-axis, y-axis or both.
4.3.3. OTHER CLASSES OF ATTACKS
Other classes of adversarial attacks includes composite at-
tacks which can be thought of combinations of the two
classes of attacks described above such as mirror-bias at-
tacks. Since this paper serves the to illustrate the emergent
coping behaviours shown by the framework in the context of
a grid-world, we did not extend the attacks to more sophis-
ticated techniques. However, in environments with higher
dimensions, more advanced adversarial functions such as
gradient based perturbations such (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Kurakin et al., 2016a;b) may be implemented.
5. Results & Discussion
In this section, we present the empirical results and observa-
tions of training the RL agent using the MLAH framework
in the presence of different adversarial function attacks. We
train a nominal RL agent on the custom Grid World with
a dimension of 21 x 21 grids with the goal of reaching the
center coordinate at (11, 11) with a episodic limit of 100
steps per episode. In each experiment, we first pre-train
one of the sub-policies under nominal conditions for 40 roll-
outs to ensure that the agent has learn the nominal policy
well. After 40 roll-outs, we periodically attack the RL agent
with the adversarial attacks defined in the previous section
and jointly train both sub-policies and the master policy for
another 450 roll-outs with each roll-out being capped at a
1000 total steps.
5.1. Emergent Coping Behaviour of MLAH Against
Different Attacks
In Figure 3, we compare the performance of a nominal
agent with access to only one sub-policy (shown in red) with
the performance of the MLAH agent (shown in cyan with
different random seeds) under adversarial attacks across
different adversarial functions. In each experiment, we set
the adversarial attack to be active under a periodic interval
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Figure 4. Illustration of MLAH agent’s coping behaviour under
symmetrical mirror attack about the y-axis. The MLAH agent
learns to use a different sub-policy that maps the adversarial obser-
vation to an optimal action that leads it to the goal.
of 10,000 steps. As observed in the first sub-plot of each
graph, the agent is able to reach the goal under nominal
conditions in less than 10 iterations and consistently receives
nominal rewards. However, under periodical adversarial
attacks (which begins after 40 iterations), the performance
of the agent drops drastically and trend of the rewards clearly
reflects the periodic presence of adversarial attacks in all
cases.
Conversely, under the same adversarial conditions, the
MLAH agent seems to be demonstrating a certain coping
behaviour that results in it being able to achieve a high
nominal reward even under adversarial attacks. However,
we observed that the coping behaviour can sometimes be
unstable. When this occurs, the trend of the rewards starts
exhibiting the periodic presence of the adversarial attacks.
Nonetheless, the MLAH agent has the capability to recover
from such instabilities after the Master policy has observed
sufficient transitions with poor rewards.
To further understand the coping behaviour exhibited by
the MLAH agent, we visualized the actions of the agent
in the grid world that was stable under adversarial attacks.
Figure 4 illustrates the behaviour of a nominal agent and the
MLAH agent under a adversarial mirror attack around the
y-axis. As expected, once the Master agent has detected the
presence of an adversary, it learns to select a sub-policy that
has learnt the inverse of the adversarial state-action mapping.
As a result, the agent takes an action that is contrary to the
adversarial state, which resolves to the optimal policy under
nominal conditions. Similar coping behaviours are also
exhibited by the MLAH agent under different adversarial
attacks.
5.2. Effect of Attack Frequencies on Coping Behaviour
Next, we perform a study on the effect of reducing adver-
sary attack time intervals on the performance of the MLAH
Figure 5. Cumulative reward plots of MLAH agent subjected to
different intervals of adversarial mirror attacks. A noticeable trend
is that as the intervals get smaller, the agent becomes more stable,
though at a cost of a lower distribution of rewards with greater
variance, as shown in Figure 6.
agent. Since the Master’s selection of the sub-policies de-
pends strongly on it’s observation of each sub-policy’s ad-
vantage, we conjecture that were will be a limit on the ability
of the Master agent to detect the presence of an adversary
and to switch the sub-policies in the event of sparse adver-
sarial attacks. Using the Mirror-X adversarial function as
an example, we run multiple experiments on the MLAH
agent with different intervals of active adversary attacks
starting from a periodic attack at every 10,000 time steps to
a periodic attack of every 2 time steps.
Figure 5 shows the performance of the MLAH across the
different active adversarial intervals. An intriguing obser-
vation is that as the attack intervals decrease, the agent’s
performance becomes more stable as there are fewer ap-
parent dips in the cumulative reward of the agent across
different roll-outs. However, when the the distributions of
the cumulative rewards are visualized, as shown in Figure 6,
another interesting trend can be observed. Under transient
adversarial conditions where the attacks intervals are longer,
it can be seen that the majority of the rewards are clustered
more tightly together with a median reward greater than 150.
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Figure 6. Distribution of cumulative rewards for the MLAH agent
subjected to adversarial mirror attacks with different intervals.
Under long intervals of attacks, the MLAH agent has a higher dis-
tribution of rewards, albeit with several outlying points attributed
to Master agent’s instability. As attack intervals decrease, there
are fewer instabilities as evident by fewer outliers, although the
distribution of rewards shifts lower with an increase in variance.
However, as the interval of attacks decreases, there is a clear
shift in the distribution of the rewards to lower values once
the intervals are smaller than 250 steps.
It is also worth nothing that although the reward distributions
at longer attack intervals have many outliers, these points
can be attributed as the rewards when the Master agent is un-
stable and fails to select the right policy. Nevertheless, if the
outlying points are disregarded, the distribution of rewards
are much higher with a smaller variance. In comparison,
when the attack intervals are smaller, the distribution of
reward have a greater variance and lower median, though
with far fewer outlying points.
This gives us an important insight into the effectiveness of
MLAH in mitigating adversarial attacks. Given that the
adversarial attacks are not too frequent, implementing the
MLAH agent under adversarial attacks can actually result in
a higher nominal reward that reflects a much more optimal
behaviour. This is because the MLAH agent essentially
learns to assign a different sub-policy to a different state-
action mapping rather than using the same policy to relearn
a different state-action map.
On the other hand, though the nominal agent with only one
sub-policy has a lower distribution of rewards, the degra-
dation in performance isn’t too extreme either. This can
be attributed to two possible causes. First, we believe that
given a high frequency of attack, the Master agent isn’t
able resolve the difference in the underlying state-action
mapping. Hence, instead of assigning two sub-policies to
two distinct task (nominal and adversary), the Master agent
instead learns to simultaneously optimize both sub-policies
to seemingly one task. The second possible cause is due to
Figure 7. The plot at the top shows the performance of the MLAH
agent under Bias XY attacks with an active adversarial interval of
10000 steps. In the bottom plot, we show the number of times a
wrong sub-policy was selected based on an arbitrary definition of
2 latent states (nominal or adversary). We discover that the roles
of each sub-policy are not fixed to a particular latent state but can
instead evolve to maintain nominal rewards.
the environment dynamics. In the Grid World, the penalty
of the agent for taking an extra step is small relative to the
reward of reaching the goal. Hence, in the grand scheme of
things, getting deceived and taking a few additional steps
may seem insignificant. However, in environments where
there are critical states, taking one wrong action that results
in a high penalty will definitely result in a lower cumulative
reward.
5.3. Adaptive Coping Behaviour of Sub-policies
Another intriguing behaviour that we noticed from our ex-
periments was the adaptability of the sub-policies when the
Master policy switches the roles of the sub-policies. An
anecdotal example of this is shown in Figure 7. Since the
role of each sub-policy was not hard-coded (ie: sub-policy
1 for nominal conditions, sub-policy 2 for adversarial condi-
tions), the decision of selecting a sub-policy for each task
was left to the Master policy. The first plot in Figure 7 shows
the performance of the MLAH agent under the Bias-XY at-
tack.
To study the behaviour of each sub-policy, we arbitrarily
define the nominal condition as the first latent state and
the adversarial condition as a second latent state. Next, we
plot the number of times a wrong sub-policy was selected
with respect to the latent conditions in the second plot of
Figure 7. Hence, in an ideal situation where the Master
policy consistently selects the correct sub-policy for the
correct latent condition, the second plot in Figure 7 should
be a horizontal line at zero. However, we observed that
the Master policy initially selects a high ratio of the wrong
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sub-policy before leveling out to 0 after the 300th roll-out.
Nonetheless, the cumulative rewards in the initial phase
remains largely nominal in the top plot.
This signifies that although the Master’s initial selection of
sub-policy was wrong by our arbitrary definition, the sub-
policies themselves can adapt to cope with the adversarial
attacks to maintain nominal rewards. In the latter phase of
the roll-outs, the Master policy starts to select the correct
sub-policy according to our definition and once again, the
sub-policies switch roles to adapt to the different state-action
mapping. One important implication of this characteristic is
that this framework can potentially be used to cope against
evolving or multiple strategies of adversarial attacks since
the sub-policies themselves have the capacity to evolve and
adapt. However, if more than one distinct attack strategies
are being applied in a short interval of time, the sub-policies
might not be able to adapt as quickly and a third sub-policy
might be required to mitigate the attacks.
6. Conclusion & Future Works
In this work, we demonstrated the coping behaviours of a
MLAH agent that was subjected to multiple different adver-
sarial attacks in a Grid World environment. We observed
that the Master policy is capable of a selecting a sub-policy
that learns to map an adversarial observation to action that
leads to nominal rewards. Furthermore, we perform a study
on the effect of attack intervals on the agent’s performance.
We find that for longer intervals of attacks, the MLAH agent
is able to distinguish between different underlying task dis-
tributions to select the right sub-policy to cope. Neverthe-
less, the process can sometimes be unstable. In contrast, for
shorter intervals of attacks, the switching of the sub-policies
becomes more stable but at the cost of a lower distribution
of rewards and a greater variance.
Additionally, we also find that the sub-policies themselves
can be adaptive when the Master policy fails to select the
sub-policy, hence adding a hierarchy of robustness to this
framework. Future works include modifying the algorithm
to stabilize the selection process of the sub-policies. Another
interesting avenue of work is to look at the effectiveness of
this framework when the agent’s action signals and reward
signals are corrupted.
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